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NORTHWESTERN UIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
DONALD G. BAIRD, Editor
BURDEN OF DETERMINING ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS [FEDERAL]
Courts and leading legal writers seem to
have little trouble in accepting the theory
that extrajudicial confessions voluntarily
made may be introduced into court as evi-
dence while involuntary confessions made
outside the court room should be excluded.1
The confusion has centered around the
problem of determining what is voluntary
and what is not, who should decide this
issue, and the procedural process to be used
in introducing a confession into court as
evidence.
This confusion was recently typified in
the case of White v. State.2 In this case the
United States Supreme Court reviewed, by
writ of certiorari, the opinion of the Court
of Criminal Appeals of Texas3 in its treat-
ment of the question of a confession in-
volved in the trial of the petitioner. He had
been convicted of rape and sentenced to
death by the District Court of Montgomery
County, Texas. The Criminal Appeals
court affirmed the decision by denying a
rehearing. The evidence, as brought out by
the trial court, indicated that the petitioner
was an illiterate farmhand and that he,
with fifteen or sixteen other negroes, were
taken into custody to be questioned shortly
after the attack. He was held for six or
seven days without a warrant for his ar-
rest or filing of charges. On several suc-
cessive nights armed Texas Rangers took
him handcuffed from the jail "up in the
woods somewhere," whipped him, and
sought to obtain a confession. At this time
1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th ed., 1935)
§591; Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) §815;
Brain. v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897).
? White v. State, 310 U. S. 530 (1940).
3 White v. State, 1370 Tex. Crim. 116, 128 S. W.(2d) 51 (1940).
4 Annotation, 102 A. L. R. 605, 608.
5 This decision was based largely on the hold-
ings of two prior decisions decided within the
same year involving much the same questions.
he had no lawyer and was out of touch
with friends or relatives. On the night that
the confession in question was obtained he
was questioned from about eleven in the
evening till three in the morning, at which
time the state obtained what it considered
a confession.
The procedure in the Texas courts is to
submit the question of voluntariness to the
jury.4 In accordance with this usual
method the Texas Appeal Court affirmed
the procedure of the trial court in permit-
ting the whole question of voluntariness to
go to the jury with the stipulation that it
was not to consider the confession in
awarding the verdict unless they believed
that the confession had been voluntarily
obtained. Ordinarily an appellate court
will review the facts in a case only to de-
termine whether the accused has been de-
nied due process. Since the confession was
used in the trial of this case, the Supreme
Court concluded that it had the right to
review the record to determine whether
the trial fell short of the procedural due
process guaranteed by the Constitution in
the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 They held
that the confession was improperly ad-
mitted into evidence and reversed the con-
viction.
Generally before a confession may be
admitted into trial its admissibility must
be ruled upon by the trial judge." It is
this procedural point which seems to
trouble numerous courts and seems to have
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227; Canty v.
Alabama, 308 U. S. 612. In each case the court
held that there was a denial of procedural due
process. In Chambers v. Florida the Court deals
at length with the reasons for holding that there
was a denial. In the case under discussion the
Court simply holds that there was a denial of
due process without giving any reasons, referring
to the above two cases.
6 Wigmore, Evidence §861.
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been the source of trouble in the above
case. The question arises: Should the
judge alone rule on the admissibility of the
confession as evidence, or should he ob-
tain the aid of the jury? If he does he is
denying himself one of his ordinary func-
tions; yet if he decides the issue oft times
it must be on the basis of conflicting testi-
mony. Most courts, however, seem to agree
that the entire question should not be
dumped into the lap of the jury, that there
should be some preliminary investigation
by the judge before the question of volun-
tariness is submitted to the jury.7 Even the
Texas courts do not admit that the question
of voluntariness of a confession should be
submitted to the jury without first passing
on its admissibility.$ There should be some
preliminary investigation outside the pres-
ence of the jury. The courts are not clear
as of what this investigation should consist,
but it is indicated that questions proper to
be considered include the sex, age, char-
acter, disposition, education, previous
training, mental qualities, physical health,
and the surroundings of the accusedY As
indicated above, whether the judge should
go on to decide as a matter of law, having
considered the facts, the voluntariness of
the confession, has left the courts in con-
fusion. Where the evidence is conflicting
and contradictory, failing to show conclu-
sively whether the confession was rendered
under voluntary circumstances or not, it
is easy for the judge to push the whole
burden upon the jury.
There seem to be two reasons against
submitting the whole issue to the jury.
Mr. Wigmore has stated, and this seems to
be confirmed by the courts, that "the prin-
ciple upon which a confession is treated as
sometimes inadmissible is that under cer-
tain donditions it becomes untrustworthy
as testimony."10 Although there is this con-
flict and dispute as to the validity of con-
fessions it should not be suggested that
they be discarded in the best interests of
obtaining justice and avoiding confusion
in the courts. If this were done the defend-
ant would be tried on the surrounding facts
7 Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613 (1895);
United States v. Stone, 8 F. 232 (W. D. Tenn.,
1881).
8 Bingham v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 594, 262 S. W.
747 (1924).
9 State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P. (2d) 1010(1938); People v. Klycze], 307 Ill. 150, 138 N. E.
275 (1923).
alone, and this controversial piece of evi-
dence would never enter the trial. How-
ever, as pointed out by Wharton, the "aim
of the confession rule is to exclude self-in-
criminating statements which are false.""
Confessions when properly obtained are
the best pieces of evidence which a prose-
cutor may use. An accused person is not
apt to admit his guilt voluntarily unless he
has truly committed the crime. Hence it
would seem that confessions should not be
discarded but should be made to function
properly.
The basis of the confession is that the
accused has given a true and accurate pic-
ture of the events leading up to the crime,
the incidents surrounding the crime, and
his role in the crime. The confession is
then introduced'as testimony by the State
for the court to consider along with other
facts. But, if the question is submitted to
the jury to decide on its voluntariness and
the confession is not sufficiently imbued
with the element of trustworthiness, the
jury is apt to decide the question on false
issues or statements. By this method the
defendant is not accorded a fair trial.
Cases should not be decided on false state-
ments and they should not reach the ears
of the jurors.
Most courts, which leave the question of
voluntariness to the juries, instruct them
that if they find the confession to be invol-,
untary to disregard it.' However, it would
appear hard for juries which have heard
an involuntary confession and the wit-
nesses who .testified to it, to totally ignore
it, especially when some, if not all, the
statements in the involuntary confession
are true. If nothing more it is apt to be a
subconscious influence.' s In support of this
Wharton says, "When the proposing coun-
sel knows that the confession's admission
will be disputed, and therefore a ruling of
the trial judge will be required before the
evidence is properly admissible a careful
regard for orderly procedure demands that
the details of the offer should not be stated
in the hearing of the jury. This caution in
no way impugns the intelligence or impar-
10 Wigmore, Evidence §822.
See Note (1940), 33 J. Crin. Law 457.
1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence §603.
12 Annotation, 85 A. L. R. 870.
'3 People v. Farmer, 194 N. Y. 251, 87 N. E.
457 (1909).
CRIMINAL CASES
tially of the jurors, but only seeks to safe-
guard the accused against the trial of- the
charge upon irrelevant testimony. The
jurors, lacking the experience and training
necessary to distinguish between relevant
and irrelevant evidence, may take as true
and relevant the evidence sought to be of-
fered, even though it should be excluded
by the judge."14
The other reason that the jury should not
determine the admissibility, which is of a
mechanical nature, is that in many states
the testimony and evidence has to be pre-
sented twice. First the evidence has to be
submitted to the judge to enable him to
pass on the admissibility of the confession
into the trial. If it is admitted and the jury
is to pass on its voluntariness, the same and
additional evidence must be presented to
enable the jury to reach its determination.
This is time consuming to courts already
over docketed, and expensive to tax-
payers.' 5
The Missouri courts have waivered from
one side of the issue to the other. In a
recent case 6 an attempt was made to com-
bine the two positions by holding that one
should be granted a preliminary inquiry
out of the presence of the jury. "When
there is substantial conflicting evidence and
the question is close it is better to refer the
issue to the jury than to exclude the con-
fession, since there is less chance of a mis-
carriage of justice by leaving the question
open to a second determination before the
jury on a rehearing of the evidence under
proper instructions than by foreclosing the
inquiry. The court, then, can still exclude
the confession if it finds from all the evi-
dence including that introduced at the pre-
liminary hearing that the same was invol-
untary."17 This position would still seem
to bear the stigma that if the confession is
14 Wharton, Criminal Evidence §593.
15 A reason sometimes introduced is that once
an involuntary confession is introduced as evi-
dence the accused is forced to give testimony
against himself. It has been thought that this is
a violation of a constitutional inhibition and
should not be tolerated. However, this theory
has been generally discredited. Wharton, Crim-
inal Evidence §603.
16 State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S. W. (2d)
88 (1938). This case contains a comprehensive list
of the holdings of the Missouri Supreme Court
on both sides of the issue.
17 Id. 585.
18 Wigmore, Evidence §861.
19 Annotation, 85 A. L. R. 870. The author of
withdrawn the jury has still heard the
confession and may be unduly influenced.
Likewise it is time consuming in that the
evidence must be presented twice.
Of the two methods that are now in use,
it would seem that those states which have
adopted the procedure that the judge
should pass on all questions as to the ad-
missibility of confessions, including the
question of voluntariness, have the better
solution. If the confession is withheld, it
cannot be considered in further proceed-
ings and hence cannot be a source of appeal
to a higher court. This conclusion is sup-
ported by Mr. Wigmore who states, "The
admissibility of the confession . . . is a
question for the judge, on elementary prin-
ciples defining the functions of judge and
jury."'1 8 Seemingly the states are, numeri-
cally, fairly evenly divided on the issue of
voluntariness, with some remaining doubt-
ful. The author of an annotated note in
the A. L. R.19 on the subject after discuss-
ing the cases on both sides reaches the con-
clusion that the question should be solely
the judge.20
A solution, which it is felt might greatly
aid the courts in the determination of this
troublesome question, would be for the
judge to make a final determination of the
admissibility of the confession. However,
in reaching this conclusion, if the evidence
were conflicting, he would call upon the
jury to determine the facts, without having
the confession itself submitted to them for
consideration. Thus if the confession was
found to be involuntarily obtained and
hence not admissible as evidence, the case
would proceed without the confession and
the material in the confession would never
have reached the ears of the jurors.
WLLAm D. GOOD
this note lists 12 states as supporting the propo-
sition that the question of voluntariness is solely
for the court; 16 states and the District of Co-
lumbia as handling the issue to the jury: and the
rest as not having committed themselves to a
conclusive decision.
20 Since the jury, even in those states which
hold that the judge must pass on the admissibility
of a confession, can and do hear the facts sur-
rounding the confession to determine the com-
petency and weight to be given it, they are in
many respects given a final determination of the
question. It would seem, therefore, unnecessary
for them to have any part in the determination
of the admissibility or voluntariness of the con-
fession.
UNNECESSARY KILLING BY THE OVER ZEALOUS PEACE OFFICER
[KENTUCKY]
The appellant, in the case of Woods v.
Commonwealth,' had served as a deputy
sheriff or a deputy jailor for ten years. In
the words of the court, he had proved him-
self a "faithful and fearless officer." On the
day of the killing, the appellant was sitting
with his two sons and several friends in the
county court house observing the Sunday
activities of some of the town residents out-
.side. Erroneously believing two of the town
citizens were "staggering drunk," he ver-
bally deputized his son and, with the aid
of the son, attempted to arrest them. Two
friends of those being arrested ran up with
pistols and in the melee that ensued, one of
these friends shot at the appellant and was
thereupon shot and killed by the son. The
case at bar is not concerned with this kill-
ing,2 but rather with the killing by the ap-
pellant himself of a new party who, un-
armed, rushed up to find out what was
goihg on and who, according to the testi-
mony of several witnesses (but denied by
others3 ) had his hands up and was begging
for mercy when he was shot. The appellant
was tried and convicted of murder and the
conviction was affirmed by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals.
1139 S. W. (2d) 439, 282 Ky. 596 (1940).
2 The sbn and the father were jointly indicted
for murder. On the motion of the Common-
wealth, the court permitted separate trials. Al-
though the discretion of the court in granting
the severance was relied on as one of the basis
for reversal, it was held to be a valid exercise of
the court's discretion under §237 of the Criminal
Code of Practice of Kentucky:
"If two or more defendants be jointly in-
dicted for a felony, any defendant is entitled to
a separate trial."
The section has been construed as mandatory,
and in the leading case of Jenkins v. Common-
wealth, 167 Ky. 544; 180 S. W. 961 (1915), has been
held to be grantable in the court's discretion at
the behest of the state.
s The testimony of the appellant was that he
saw Morgan (the deceased) approaching; that
Morgan kept grabbing at him, appellant telling
him to keep back. That Morgan kept coming
and grabbing with one hand, the other down by
his side. The court remarks that this testimony
is corroborated by the son of the appellant and
to some extent by eye witneses to some if not all
of the occurrences. This would seem to indicate
that the evidence is by no means one-sided.
4 4 Amer Juris 54 §78; Annotations, 3 A. L. R.
1170; 42 A. L. R. 1200; 67 L. R. A. 298 (1905); 2
As a general rule, in the case of a mis-
demeanor, an officer has no right, except in
self-defense, to shoot or kill the offender
in attempting to arrest him, or prevent his
escape.4 And it is said that the taking of
the misdemeanant's life will ordinarily be
found to be reasonable only where the of-
ficer was in reasonable apprehension of
immediate death or great bodily injuri;6
as where the deceased after being arrested
for drunken disorder attacked the town
marshal and was in the act of clubbing a
newly deputized helper when he was fatally
stabbed by that helper.6 The view uni-
formally taken by the Kentucky Court has
been that it is the duty of an officer to make
an arrest and in carrying out this duty he
may defend himself; if resisted, even to
the taking of life.7 As to the rights of an
officer to kill a peacemaker or intervener
where the law-breaker is in custody, the
officer will be protected in the use of force
that is necessary to make such an arrest 8-
if the jury find that he is acting in good faith
-and without malice.8 The books are replete
with instances where an officer has resorted
to killing to effect the capture of a misde-
L. R. A. (N. s.) 76 (1906); 30 C. J. 41 §196; 26 Am.
Jur. 315 §231, 233; Thomas v. Kinkead,'55 Ark.
502, 18 S, W. 854, 15 L. R. A. 558, 29 Am. St. Rep.
68 (1891); United States v. Kaplan, 286 F 963 (S.
D. Ga., 1923); State v. Dunning, 177 N. C. 559, 98
S. E. 530, 3 A. L. R. 1166 (1919); Smith v. State,
59 Ark. 132, 26 S. W. 712 (1894).
5 Smith v. State, 59 Ark. 12, 26 S. W. 712 (1894).
See also Note, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 539 (1928); Com-
monwealth v. Marcum, 135 Ky. 1, 122 S. W. 215
(1909); Thomas v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502 (1892),
18 S. W. 854.
6 Smith v. State, 59 Ark. 132, 26 S. W. 712 (1894).
7 Note (1929), 17 Ky. L. J. 403. Reasonable fear
of great bodily harm will justify an officer in
shooting.
8 It is not the purpose of this note to attempt a
rationale of such cases in which a homicide has
been committed by a law enforcing officer in the
course of an arrest, or in the prevention of the
escape of an arrested law-breaker. For an ade-
quate rationale of such cases see Notes, 12 Minn.
L. Rev. 539 (1928); 28Mich. Law Rev. 957 (1930);
13 Tenn. L. Rev. 195 (1935); 17 Ky. Law J. 402(1929); 24 Va. Law Rev. (N. S. 4) 624 (1919); 4
So. African Law Times 7 (1935).
9State v. Rollins, 113 N. C. 722, 18 S. E. 394
(1893); Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837, 26
Am. St. Rep. 75 (1891).
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meanant 0 or has met with interference
by a third party, and has killed the inter-
loper," and in a large percentage of these
cases convictions have been reversed.
There is, however, a noticeable lack of
authorities "on all fours" with the present
fact situation. The deceased in the Woods
case was not a misdemeanant. Nor did he,
according to part of the evidence, interfere
with the appellant's proposed arrests or aid
the actual misdemeanants resist arrest. 2
It is this fact that the court seems to rely
on mainly to distinguish the present case
from the majority of decisions concerned
with the rights of an officer to use force-
even to the taking of human life-in the ar-
rest or in the prevention of escape of a mis-
demeanant. And it is probably the adop-
tion of this distinction that led the court to
uphold a conviction of murder.13 It is well'
10 Reed v. Commonwealth, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1212,
100 S. W. 856 (1907); Commonwealth v. Rhoades,
23 Pa. Super. Ct. 512 (1903); State v. Whittle, 59
S. C. 297, 37 S. E. 923 (1901); Thomas v. Kincaid,
55 Ark. 502, 29 Am. St. Rep. 68 (1891); Handley v.
State, 96 Ala. 48, 11 So. 322 (1892); Shelton v.
Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 460, 11 S. W. (2d) 125
(1928); Stephens v. Commonwealth, 20 Ky. L.
Rep. 544, 47 S. W. 229 (1898); Smith v. State, 59
Ark. 132, 26 S. W. 712 (1894). See note 15 post.
1130 C. J. 42 §199; State v. Rollins, 113 N. C.
722, 18 S. E. 394 (1893); State v. Smith, 127 Iowa
534, 103 N. W. 944 (1905); State v. Dierberger, 96
Mo. 666, 10 S. W. 168 (1888); State v. Bland, 97
N. C. 438, 2 S. E. 460 (1887); Campbell v. People,
55 Colo. 302, 133 P. 1043 (1913); Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 176 Ky. 466, 195 S. W. 811 (1917).
12 The case of Smith v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky.
466, 195 S. W. 811 (1917) is perhaps as nearly
analogous as any other case might be. Since it
is from the same jurisdiction and the decision
is in apparent direct conflict, it might be well
to note. In that case, the defendant was appointed
deputy marshal on the day before the circus
came to town. The defendant arrested A; B and
C came down the street, according to the state's
testimony, and asked about A. As B and C
turned, the defendant knocked B down. When
C tried to help B up, the defendant shot C,
killing him. The defendant said that B reached
for a gun so that he (the defendant) shot in
self-defense whereupon C jumped him, nd the
defendant then killed C. The lower court con-
victed the defendant of manslaughter. This court
reversed saying that "While it is true that an
officer in arresting one guilty of a misdemeanor
is never justified in killing merely to effect the
arrest or to prevent his escape by flight, yet if
the misdemeanant be under arrest and attempts
by force and violence to overcome the officer and
effect his escape, the officer's right to kill is not
limited to the single ground of self-defense, but
he may use such force as is necessary, but no
to note that the court believed that the trial
of the appellant was more favorable than
prejudicial in that it gave the officer the
benefit of an instruction on the rights of
officers to kill to effect an arrest when all
the court felt the jailor was entitled to
was an instruction on his rights of self-
defense.1
4
It is evident that if the court in the Woods
case had resolved their decision on the
basis of a killing of a misdemeanant by a
law-enforcing officer during the course of
an arrest, a conviction of murder would
have been not only contrary to the majority
of cases recognized today in American
courts in general and in the Kentucky
courts in particular, but also very unusual.
Most of the reported cases, if they convict
the officer of homicide at all, go no further
than a conviction of manslaughter.' 5 It may
more, to overcome the forcible resistance of the
prisoner; and if under these circumstances he
shoots and kills the prisoner; the killing will be
excusable if the officer could not, or it reason-
ably appeared to him that he could not other-
wise overcome such forcible resistance. . . there
is every reason why the same rule should apply
to a third person who is attempting by force or
violence to rescue the prisoner."
13 ". . . it is to be remembered that the object
of the law is to prevent human life being en-
dangered or taken... As the purpose is to com-
pel men to abstain from dangerous conduct, and
not merely to restrain them from evil inclina-
tions, the law requires them at their peril to
know the teachings of common experience, just
as it requires them to know the law.. ." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, pp. 56-7
(1881). After all, we know that the law has laid
a price on human life. Where a life is taken with
the approval (or at least the suffrance) of society,
it is a homicide "excusable" or "justifiable." On
the other hand, when a killing is wrongful, the
law terms it "murder" or "manslaughter," and
we expect the penalty to be exacted.
14The instruction told the jury that if it was
believed that "the deceased Morgan did by force
or violence attempt to prevent the arrest or to
rescue Oma Mattingly from the custody of
Defendant, and if you shall believe from the
evidence that the defendant believed in the
exercise of a reasonable judgment that it was
necessary to shoot, wound or kill Morgan in
order to repel and overcome the force or violence
offered him, then you will find for the defend-
ant." 139 S. W. (2) 439, 445-6.
I In cases where a law enforcing officer has
killed a misdemeanant during the course of an
arrest, and the officer is clearly at fault, the usual
conviction goes no further than manslaughter.
This has been noticeable particularly in Ken-
tucky, the jurisdiction of the Woods case: Doolin
v. Commonwealth, 95 Ky. 29, 23 S. W. 663 (1893)
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well be that the court in the present case
was a bit too harsh on the appellant. After
all, a conviction of murder usually is based
on the presence of express or implied mal-
ice.16 And it is to be noted that though the
testimony of the prosecution is given a
greater degree of credence, the appellant
has stated that: "He [the deceased]
dropped his hand down to his side, and I
thought he might have a pistol in his hand.
* . I was afraid he had a pistol. . . . I
shot him and was afraid not to shoot him;
afraid he would kill me."'7 Considering the
fact that the deputy jailor had a praise-
worthy record for ten years, a conviction
of no more than manslaughter might have
served the purpose just as well. It would
have adequately chastised the hair-trig-
gered officer without unduly hampering the
work of the conscientious law enforcer.
It might be suggested that perhaps the
present case is but an unfortunate example
of an instance where a jury, adequately in-
structed under the existing and accepted
law, came to the most harsh of several pos-
sible decisions; it is altogether possible that
neither the trial nor the appellate court felt
that it was able to refute the jury verdict,
founded, as it was, simply on the narrowest
notion of the rights of an arresting officer.
It thus appears that our problem is not
(Indictment and conviction of a constable for
murder of a misdemeanant reversed on wrong
jury instruction; Bowman v. Commonwealth,
96 Ky. 8, 27 S. W. 870 (1894) (Indictment and
conviction of deputy marshal for murder re-
manded); Stevens v. Commonwealth, 124 Ky.
32, 98 S. W. 284 (1906) (Indictment of marshal
for murder, conviction for voluntary man-
slaughter); Kammerer v. Commonwealth, 140
Ky. 626, 131 S. W. 486 (1910) (Indictment of
constable for murder, conviction of manslaughter
reversed); Clem v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 486,
248 S. W. 1036 (1923) (Indictment of deputy
sheriff for murder, conviction of manslaughter.
Manslaughter conviction reversed and remanded
in 213 Ky. 265, 280 S. W. 1104 (1926)); Gipson v.
Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 710, 286 S. W. 1069 (1926)
(Conviction of peace officer for manslaughter
reversed); Miller and Gabbard v. Common-
wealth, 215 Ky. 819, 287 S. W. 6 (1926) (Man-
slaughter conviction reversed and remanded);
Mullins v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 60, 292 S. W.
471 (1927) (Indictment for murder. Conviction
of manslaughter reversed and remanded);
Shelton v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 460, 11 S. W.
(2d) 125 (1928) (Indictment for murder. Con-
viction of manslaughter reversed); Neal v. Com-
monwealth, 229 Ky. 832, 18 S. W. (2d) 314 (1929)(Indictment for murder. Conviction of man-
strictly one of criticism. It is as much a task
in indicating the conflicts in policy that
must be recognized, and in weighing the
considerations that must determine the re-
sults of those conflicts.
On the one hand if an officer is to be too
much restricted in the performance of his
duty to make arrests, crime will be en-
couraged. It has been said that all crim-
inals fear the law-it is something that they
can neither stab nor choke to death. What
they do not fear is the administration of the
law if there is a laxity in that administra-
tion. s
On the other hand, our government, at
least theoretically, guarantees every man
his life, his liberty, and his property. It
would be indeed shocking to the good order
of government if we were to cheapen hu-
man life by the protection of a gratuitous
killing of a misdemeanant or the killing of
one who innocently ventures on the scene
of an arrest.
The problem reduced to its ultimate form
seems to be simply: How far should the
cloak of protection of peace officers in the
arrest of misdemeanants be spread;
should the officer or a jury be made the ar-
biter of the amount of force necessary to
effect the duty of law enforcement? 9 Is it
necessary for the purpose of law enforce-
slaughter reversed and remanded); Maggard v.
Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 10, 22 S. W. (2d) 298
(1929) (Deputy sheriff indicted for murder.
Conviction of manslaughter reversed); Johnson
v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 555, 105 S. W. (2d)
641 (1937) (Deputy constable indicted for mur-
der. Conviction of manslaughter reversed);
Siler v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 830, 134 S. W.
(2d) 945 (1939) (Indictment of deputy Sheriff
for voluntary manslaughter, conviction of man-
slaughter reversed).
16 "Malice or malice aforethought is the ele-
ment which distinguishes murder at Common
Law and, commonly, under the statute defining
murder, from the other grades of homicide."
29 C. J. 1084 §60. 29 C. J. 1089 §§63-45; Express
and implied malice in murder, 26 Am. Jur. 183
§§40, 41.
17 139 S. W. (2d) 439, 446.
Is Franklin, When May a Police Officer Slay
in Making an Arrest (1931), 17 A. B. A. J. 675.
19 "The jury is, of course, the arbiter of the
amount of force which could be properly used
uider the circumstances of the particular case."
4 Am. Jur. 53 §74. It is enough if the force used
appears necessary to the officer if he has rea-
sonable grounds for his belief; Gillispie v. State,
69 Ark. 573, 64 S. W. 947 (1901); State v. Rose,
142 Mo. 418, 44 S. W. (1898).
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ment that officers be given a free hand in
making such arrests? If by a mistake in
judgment-reasonable or otherwise-an
innocent bystander is killed, shall the of-
ficer be protected? 20 Or, is public policy
furthered by requiring that the officer act
at his own risk when only in the final anal-
ysis does it become evident that the de-
ceased actually intended no interference
with the officer's law enforcement activi-
ties?
The answer we read in Woods v. Com-
monwealth is simply that the law does not
spread its protection so far; the Kentucky
court has seized the stricter horn of the
policy dilemma. The fact that the problem
of the case so infrequently arises gives
weight to the argument that it is enough
if the force used appears necessary to the
officer if he has reasonable grounds for his
belief. Yet it would be presumptious in-
deed, on the basis of a record that presents
so sharp a dicotomy in factual impres-
20 In addition to the cases enumerated in pre-
vious footnotes, consider the "negligent murder"
cases, such as; Wiley v. State, 19 Ariz. 346, 170
P. 869 (1918); Banks v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. 165, 211
S. W. 217 (1919); Mayes v. People, 106 Ill. 306
(1883); and Note (1939) 28 Ky. L. J. 53.
21 "The process of inclusion and exclusion so
sions and testimony, to accuse the court of
an error in judgment.
It would be well for the courts to rec-
ognize that the cases cannot be decided on
any categorical statement of a rule of law.
The considerations of public policy must be
brought to bear on the particular factual
conditions. And it is that particular factual
set-up that must determine which policy
must dominate.
There is no one "true" rule. There is no
single erudite principle that can be deduced
from Woods v. Commonwealth. If there is
any importance to the case, it can come
only through the adumbrations it casts on
the decisions in similar cases that may arise
at some future time. And it is to be hoped
that those later courts recognize the basis
on which the Woods case stands, so that the
decision is not blindly followed to an end
that was never intended. 2
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often applied in developing a rule cannot end
with its first enunciation. The rule as announced
must be deemed tentative. For the many and
varying facts to which it will be applied cannot
be foreseen. Modification implies growth. It is
the life of the law." Mr. Justice Brandeis, in
Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219, 236 (1924).
ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF PREJUDICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS
[SOUTH CAROLINA]
In State v. Edwards,1 a murder case, a
photograph showing the maggot-covered
body of the deceased was admitted into
evidence, over the defense counsel's objec-
tion, as being relevant to the issue of the
body's identification, even though prior to
its introduction, witnesses had testified in
detail to everything depicted by the photo-
graph. Upon review, the majority of the
court held the photograph relevant to the
identification problem and that the admis-
sion of the photograph was not an abuse
of the trial judge's discretion. The dissent
argued that the gruesome photograph prej-
udiced the jury against the defendant, be-
cause there never was any real issue that
1 10 S. E. (Qd) 587, 194 S. C. 410 (1940).
2 One being tried for an offense, especially one
involving the possible forfeiture of his life, is
the body was not that of Maggie McDaniels,
and that the State did not have to use the
photograph to identify the deceased, as the
State did not rely upon it for the identi-
fication.
Where the State offers evidence that is of
an inflammatory character, the court is
faced with a serious dilemma-should it
exclude the exhibit, it may injure the
state's case, so that, as a result the accused
may be acquitted, when he ought properly
to have been convicted; should it admit the
exhibit, its prejudicial character might so
inflame the jurors, that, as an immediate
result, the accused may be convicted.2
Also, as an immediate result of introducing
entitled to a trial on competent evidence-tend-
ing to show his guilt or innocence--not on evi-
dence having no bearing in that direction but
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such an exhibit into evidence there is dan-
ger that the defendant might be convicted
of a higher degree of a crime or be given a
greater penalty by the jury, than had the
photograph not been admitted.3 Thus, it can
be seen that the reviewing court must pick
its way carefully lest its opinion should
prove too harsh either on the state or the
defendant.
Apparently, the underlying premise of
the majority of the Court in this case is that
since the state must show a preponderance
of the evidence to obtain a conviction, it
should be allowed to offer into evidence
any and all matters that sustain the State's
theory of the case, subject, of course, to
limitations as to time materiality, etc. Also
the majority seemingly believed that the
trial court could better determine the rel-
evency of the exhibit and that its determi-
hation should be set aside only when
clearly unreasonable.
Generally, photographs, and other like
exhibits, which are introduced to help es-
which can only distract the jurors from the real
issue to the gruesome exhibits, which may easily
lead them to an incorrect conclusion. McKay v.
State, 90 Neb. 63, 132 N. W. 741 (1911) (Coroner's
testimony clearly showed deceased was mur-
dered. Admission of bloody garments couldn't
tend to identify accused as the murderer. Only
purpose was to improperly excite the jury.) "A
photograph, proved to be a true representation
of the person, place, or thing which it purports
to represent is competent evidence of anything
of which it is competent and relevant for a
witness to give a verbal description." 16 C. J.
p. 744, §1528.
3 Miranda v. State, 42 Ariz. 358, 26 P. (2d) 241
(1933) (bloodstained bedstead and bedding held
admissible to show malice.)
4 People v. Davis, 106 Cal. App. 179, 289 P. 194
(1930) (to establi'h identity); People v. Lee Nam
Chin, 166 Cal. 570, 137 P. 917 (1913) (to illustrate
how deceased was killed); State v. Williams, 195
Iowa 785, 192 N. W. 901 (1923) (deceased mur-
dered, body violated. Held admissible to show
manner and motive); State v. Burrell, 112 N. Y
L. 330, 170 A. 843 (1934) (offered to show bruises
on victim's throat in support of State's theory that
deceased was strangled); People v. Saenz, 50 Cal.
App. 382, 195 P. 442 (1920) (to illustrate manner
and form of assault; also some question of iden-
tity was involved); State v. Dong Sing et al, 208
P. 860, 35 Idaho 616 (1922) (Clothing admitted to
bolster State's claim that the two defendants en-
gaged in the shooting resulting in deceased's
death); People v. Elmore, 167 Cal. 205 138 P. 989
(1914) (photo of deceased's severed windpipe
with edges of the cut held apart by sticks held
admissible to show character of the wound).
5 Blazka v. State, 105 Neb. 13, 178 N. W. 832
(1920); Simmons v. State, 111 Neb. 644, 197 N. W.
tablish a necessary element in the crime,
are held admissible even though they
arouse the passions of the jury to the de-
fendant's prejudice.' Consistent with this
view, there is a line of cases holding such
exhibits are inadmissible only when they
do not illustrate or clarify a controverted
issue and when they are of such a char-
acter as to prejudice or influence the jur-
ors.' For example, it has been held that,
after a sufficient foundation has been laid,
clothing worn by the deceased is admis-
sible, if it illustrates or clarifies a point in
issue; 6 likewise, it has been held that a de-
ceased's photograph should not be intro-
duced in a murder prosecution, unless
there is an issue as to identification. 7
Some courts, however, are even more
lenient with the'introduction of inflamma-
tory exhibits and do not exclude them even
though it is doubtful whether or not they
serve a proper purpose in the furtherance
of the State's case." State v. Heathcoat,
9
seemingly in point with the instant case,
398 (1924).
0 Williams v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. 356, 136 S. W.
771 (1911); Egbert v. State, 113 Neb. 790, 205 N. W.
252 (1925); Flege v. State, 93 Neb. 610, 142 N. W.
276 (1913); McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63, 132 N. W.
741 (1911); Cole v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 225, 75 S. W.
527 (1903); Lucas v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 219, 95 S.
W. 1055 (1906).
7 Avirett v. State, 128 Tex. Cr. 647, 84 S. W.
(2d) 482 (1935); Vaughn v. State, 19 N. E. (2d)
239, 215 Ind. 142 (1939).
s People v. Santos, 134 Cal. App. 736, 26 P. (2d)
522 (1933) (uncontradicted testimony that ac-
cused inflicted fatal wound; on stand defendant
admitted the stabbing and claimed self defense);
-People v. Burkhart, 211 Cal. 726, 297 P. 11 (1931)
(issue involved the degree of homicide; photo
showing body's position and condition held ad-
missible, though court censured prosecutor for
introducing such evidence); State v. Fine, 110
N. J. L. 67, 164 A. 433 (1933) (photo of decom-
posed body found in trunk admitted, though
body was absolutely identified and there was no
question but that death was caused by strangu-
lation. Held admissible to prove identity and the
corpus delicti. At trial defense counsel claimed
photo was irrelevant and immaterial; on appeal,
claimed photo wasn't "best cvidence"--this ob-
jection wasn't raised in trial court). Cf. Garrett
v. State, 171 Ark. 297, 284 S. W. 734 (1926) (photo
held unnecessary but its admission into evidence
was upheld on the ground that is was not prej-
udicial-as shown by the fact that accused was
convicted of the lowest degree of homicide);
Young v. State, 38 Ariz. 298, 299 P. 682 (1931)
(photo of deceased's head coated with mercuro-
chrome offered to show nature of wound, held
admissible).
0 119 N. J. L. 33, 194 A. 252 (1937).
CRIMINAL CASES
although not cited in it, concerned a prose-
cution for the murder of a woman with
whom the accused lived. The body was
discovered under a shed connected with
their home and was not found until three
months after the slaying, at which time the
State took photographs of the body and the
surroundings. Although the accused had
already admitted killing the woman, the
admission of the photographs into evidence
was held proper by the reviewing court,
which appeared to ignore the question of
relevency to the issues involved and said
only that there was nothing to suggest a
change in the body or the premises except
the ravages of time. In Janovich v. State,10
the deceased's identity and the character
of the wound was established by uncon-
troverted oral testimony; the State sought
to introduce a photograph of the body into
evidence arguing that (1) the State cannot
be limited in its manner of proof, and (2)
since the character of the wound might
have a bearing on the crime's atrocious-
ness, and since the penalty was the only
point in issue, the State ought to be able to
use the photograph to prove that the se-
verer penalty was merited, when part of
the jury's function in a case of first degree
murder was to fix the penalty. The court
held the State was not limited to oral tes-
timony, but had a right to prove its con-
tentions through the use of exhibits.1
A slight modification of the dissenting
view is exemplified by Commonwealth v.
Ferry,12 wherein the court held the admis-
sion of exhibits is within the discretion of
the trial judge, and that if he believes their
effect may be to inflame the jury against
the accused when their admission is unnec-
essary for the state to prove its case, they
should be excluded. Should the exhibits
be admitted by the trial court, a cautioning
instruction should be given the jury not to
let the exhibit arouse their emotions to the
defendent's prejudice. The reviewing court
following such a rule is apt to give greater
10 32 Ariz. 175, 256 P. 359 (1927).
"i Unfortunately, the court begged the ques-
tion by arguing that the defendant cannot com-
plain of the ill effects caused by the photograph's
introduction into evidence, as he had caused the
condition.
12 326 Pa. 129, 191 A. 130 (1937) ; Commonwealth
weight to the discretion and belief of the
trial judge than might be expected in those
courts following the somewhat stricter doc-
trine, upheld by the dissent in the instant
case, of excluding the exhibit, unless it
plays a necessary role in establishing the
controverted issue.13
Whereas, the selection of a proper course
of procedure in such cases as State v. Ed-
wards 14 is fraught with dangers, the view
taken by the dissent seems preferable. To
maintain is contention that an exhibit
should be excluded because prejudicial and
unnecessary although competent, it must
subscribe to the view that, prior to the offer
of the photograph into evidence, the jurors,
were satisfied that the state's testimony
clearly established the identification of the
deceased. To do this, of necessity, the re-
viewing court must "second-guess" how
the jury would have determined the point
without the exhibit. This view tends to
give the defense a trial de novo on the
problem of admitting a particular damag-
ing exhibit into evidence in order to sup-
port the state's contentions. Thus, if the
apparent harm to the accused in allowing
such an exhibit into evidence should seem
to outweigh the apparent support that the
exhibit lends to the state's case, the review-
ing court should rule to exclude the harm-
ful exhibit. Certainly, it is unfair to the
defense to allow a shocking exhibit to
bolster the state's case, when the exhibit
is unnecessary or nonessential to the state.
Where it is offered merely for corrobora-
tion, the court should be extremely zealous
of the defendent's interests before ruling
such evidence admissible.
Under the majority's view, by relying too
heavily upon the ruling of the trial judge,
there is a greater possibility of ignoring the
hardship worked on the defense. To have
a reversal under the majority doctrine, the
judge in the trial court must clearly have
abused his discretionary right.
v. Peronace, 328 Pa. 86, 195 A. 57 (1937). Cf.
Commonwealth v. Yeager, 329 Pa. 81, 196 A. 827
(1938).
13 McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63, 132 N. W. 741
(1911); Williams v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. 356, 136
S. W. 771 (1911).
14 10 S. E. (2d) 587, 194 S. C. 410 (1940).
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If the introduction of the photograph in
the instant case is not needless and preju-
dicial, it is difficult to conceive of such a
situation where a reversal may be had.
Primarily, though, this is an individual
problem for each judge on the reviewing
court to determine subjectively, just when
the introduction of an exhibit is "too" prej-
udicial-that is, when is the good effects
going to the State in admitting such evi-
dence, clearly outweighed by the harmful
effects borne by the accused as an imme-
diate result of the exhibit's introduction
into evidence. Therefore, the item. which
should receive the greatest protection from
the court should be the accused's interests.
When, however, the court considers the de-
fendant's rights by using the formula that
"so long as the trial judge is not abusing
his discretion, his opinion will be sus-
tained," it is apparently side-stepping the
main issue; the real problem is not whether
the trial judge acted improperly, but rather,
was the accused fairly convicted. It is not
to be expected that reviewing courts will
be as prone to hold the trial judge acted
arbitrarily, as they might hold the exhibit
was "too" prejudicial. To rule that the trial
judge arbitrarily allowed the harmful ex-
hibit into evidence is to reprimand the trial
judge's action and to slap his opinion of the
matter. But to hold the matter was "too"
prejudicial, the reviewing court need not
worry about embarrasing the trial judge as
the holding will only indicate a difference
in opinion. Hence, for the above reasons,
not only should the dissent's view of the
case be adopted, but also their line of rea-
soning. This would aid the accused in the
reviewing court, as he would not have to
prove the trial judge acted arbitrarily, but
would only have to show the needless use
of the exhibit with its consequent harm to
the defendant.
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